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INTRODUCTION 
The death penalty is a controversial issue with extensive roots in 
American history.
1
  Some believe it should continue to be used as an 
effective tool for punishment,
2
 while others consider it to be an unjust 
form of punishment that does little to actually deter murderers.
3
  Many 
predict that the death penalty may soon be abolished, including the late 
United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia.
4
  However, 
because the Supreme Court declined to find the death penalty 
unconstitutional in a recent Supreme Court case,
5
 issues surrounding 
the constitutionality of the implementation of this type of punishment 
remain both relevant and necessary to continue to explore. 
While there are many potential constitutional issues in connection 
with death penalty sentences, this comment analyzes the Sixth 
Amendment of the Constitution.
6
 
First, a brief history of the death penalty will be examined.
7
  Next, 
both the Sixth Amendment in connection with the death penalty as well 
as case law pertaining to accomplice and felony murder liability 
involving the death penalty will be addressed.
8
  This section will begin 
by assessing how much protection the Sixth Amendment provides to 
defendants concerning their right to a jury trial by examining a range of 
 
 1. See Sheherezade C. Malik & D. Paul Holdsworth, A Survey of the History of the 
Death Penalty in the United States, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 693, 693–94 (2015).  
 2. See Symposium, Be Careful What You Ask For: Lessons From New York’s Recent 
Experience With Capital Punishment, 32 VT. L. REV. 683, 689–91 (2008) (explaining 
different reasons behind supporting the death penalty, including what two scholars view as 
“the most important” contemporary justification: the retribution theory—“‘those who 
commit the most premeditated or heinous murders should be executed simply on the 
grounds that they deserve it’”).   
 3. See John D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s 
Death Penalty, and the Abolition Movement, 4 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 195, 312–26 (2009). 
This article argues that the death penalty will soon be abolished.  It claims that the death 
penalty does not deter murderers and cites studies that show no causal relationship between 
death sentences and murder rates.  “The death penalty saps the resources of America’s 
criminal justice system, and at bottom, death sentences are only corrosive of our efforts to 
build a more just and less violent society.” 
 4. Martin Kaste, Justice Scalia: ‘Wouldn’t Surprise Me’ If Supreme Court Strikes 
Down Death Penalty, NPR LAW, www.npr.org/2015/10/21/450611707/justice-scalia-
wouldnt-surprise-me-if-supreme-court-strikes-down-death-penalty (last visited December 
20, 2015) (stating that Justice Antonin Scalia said “that he would not be surprised if the 
Supreme Court strikes down the death penalty”); see also Bessler, supra note 3, at 312–26 
(arguing that the death penalty will soon be abolished). 
 
 5. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2739 (2015) (“[W]e have time and again 
reaffirmed that capital punishment is not per se unconstitutional . . . we decline to 
effectively overrule these decisions.”). 
 6. U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a . . . trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”). 
 7. See infra Part IA. 
 8. See infra Part IB. 
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relevant case law and how this right has expanded over the years.  This 
section will then discuss the case law on accomplice and felony murder 
liability; specifically, when defendants convicted under these laws may 
be sentenced to death. 
Next, the legal problem will be addressed: specifically, the lack of 
case law on whether an individual who did not commit the underlying 
murder is entitled to have a jury determine aggravating and mitigating 
factors when assessing whether or not the death penalty should be 
implemented. 
Ring v. Arizona and Tison v. Arizona will then be analyzed in 
depth.
9
  Ring provides the recent and current approach to Sixth 
Amendment claims implicating the right to a jury trial brought by 
defendants who were sentenced to death for committing murder.  Tison 
addresses when it is constitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to sentence an accomplice or someone involved in felony 
murder to death. 
Finally, in light of analyzing these two cases, this Comment 
argues that the holding in Ring should extend to Tison cases.
10
  In other 
words, accomplices and felony murder participants who face the death 
penalty should be entitled to the same Sixth Amendment protections as 
convicted murderers are per Ring.  Therefore, juries and not judges 
must assess aggravating and mitigating factors when there is a finding 
of fact that increases a defendant’s maximum punishment regardless of 
whether or not they were the actual murderer. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. History of Death Penalty 
The death penalty has been utilized as a legitimate form of 
punishment in the United States since the country’s formation.11  In 
assessing the constitutionality of the death penalty, it has been argued 
that the text of the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment demonstrates the 
founders’ acceptance of the death penalty.12  The Fifth Amendment 
states: “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . .”13  This Amendment has been construed 
to imply that “the framers of the Constitution understood and agreed 
 
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
 11. See Malik & Holdsworth, supra note 1, at 695 (“For better or worse, the death 
penalty was a staple of criminal justice in early America; it was both widely accepted and 
largely uncontroversial.”).  
 12. See id.  
 13. US Const. amend. V. 
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that life could be constitutionally taken assuming there was due process 
of law.”14 
The death penalty was originally used as a form of punishment for 
a range of crimes, including murder, witchcraft, or practicing 
Quakerism.
15
  After this initial widespread use, America began using 
the death penalty for serious crimes exclusively.
16
  There were also 
movements during the mid- to late 1800s to abolish the death penalty, 
but no significant traction was made.
17
 There was another movement 
during the 1950s and 1960s, and the use of the death penalty continued 
to decrease.
18
  Although some states have chosen to abolish the death 
penalty as a form of punishment, it remains a constitutionally 
permissible sentence to employ if the states or federal government 
choose to use it. 
B. Modern Elaboration on Constitutionality of the Death Penalty 
In 1972, the Supreme Court found that a state’s death penalty that 
gave virtually complete discretion to the jury in implementing the death 
penalty violated the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual 
punishment.
19
  While this case could have marked the end of the death 
penalty, in a subsequent case, the Court upheld versions of states’ death 
penalty laws that granted juries some discretion in applying the death 
penalty;
20
 in other words, state laws that gave total discretion to juries 
as well as state laws that gave juries no discretion in imposing the 
death penalty were unconstitutional.
21
  In order for a state law to be 
constitutional, it must satisfy the Court’s criteria. 
The Court tolerates states’ experimentation with the death penalty, 
provided that states (1) give juries some criteria—usually in the 
form of aggravating factors—to determine whether the defendant is 
eligible for the death penalty, and (2) allow juries the opportunity 
 
 14. See Malik & Holdsworth, supra note 1, at 695 (“The Fifth Amendment states, ‘No 
person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property’ although with the very important 
caveat, ‘without due process of law.’ In other words, the framers of the Constitution 
understood and agreed that life could be constitutionally taken assuming there was due 
process of law.”). 
 15. Id. at 695.   
 16. See id. at 696 (“Many states reduced the list of capital offenses to murder, rape, or 
treason.”).  
 17. See, id. at 697–99; see also, Lyn Suzanne Entzeroth, The End of the Beginning: The 
Politics of Death and the American Death Penalty Regime in the Twenty-First Century, 90 
OR. L. REV. 797, 802–03 (2012) (explaining that several states abolished the death penalty 
from the 1840s to the early 1900s, but some went on to reinstate it). 
 18. See Entzeroth, supra note 18, at 803.  
 19. See id. at 804 (describing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)). 
 20. See id. at 807 (describing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)). 
 21. Id. at 807–08. 
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to consider mitigating evidence and perform individualized 
sentencing to impose a sentence less than death, if warranted.
22
 
Since this modern elaboration on crafting death penalty laws, the 
Supreme Court has imposed some additional restrictions.  For example, 
“in 2002 and 2005, the Court restricted the states’ prerogatives in 
structuring their capital sentencing regimes by forbidding the 
imposition of the death penalty on mentally retarded offenders and 
juvenile offenders.”23  The Court has also held that “the death penalty 
is an excessive punishment for ordinary crimes in which the victim is 
not murdered,” including raping a child.24 
C. Constitutional Issues Surrounding the Imposition of the Death 
Penalty: 
1. Death Penalty and the Sixth Amendment 
Over the years there have been constitutional challenges to 
various death penalty laws claiming violations of the Sixth 
Amendment.  Among other things, the Sixth Amendment guarantees 
that a defendant will be tried before an impartial jury in criminal 
cases.
25
  However, the determination of what the right to a jury trial 
means has evolved over the years.  The following cases illustrate an 
expansion in terms of the scope of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right: initially the right was interpreted to allow for judicial override of 
jury determinations but over time the right has expanded to require a 
jury to make any findings that increase the statutory maximum 
punishment, including aggravating factors.
26
  
Spaziano v. Florida 
In Spaziano v. Florida,
27
 the Supreme Court held that it did not 
violate the Sixth Amendment when a judge overrode the jury’s 
sentence in imposing the death penalty.
28
  In Spaziano, the defendant 
 
 22. Id. at 809 (referencing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153). 
 23. Id. at 815 (referencing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319–21 (2002) in regards 
to the mentally retarded death penalty limitation and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–
79 (2005) in regards to the juvenile death penalty limitation). 
 24. See Entzeroth, supra note 18, at 815–16 (explaining the holding in Kennedy v. 
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420-21 (2008)). 
 25. US Const. Amend. VI. 
 26. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990) (quoting Poland v. Arizona, 476 
U.S. 147 (1986)) (“Aggravating circumstances are not separate penalties or offenses, but are 
‘standards to guide the making of [the] choice’ between the alternative verdicts of death and 
life imprisonment.”). 
 27. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984). 
 28. Id. at 465–66 (“The advice does not become a judgment simply because it comes 
from the jury.”).  
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was found guilty of first-degree murder and the jury recommended the 
defendant serve life in prison.
29
  Based on Florida’s state laws, the 
judge conducted his own assessment of the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, overrode the jury’s sentence, and imposed the death 
penalty.
30
 
The Supreme Court upheld the judge’s conviction holding that: 
“Regardless of the jury’s recommendation, the trial judge is required to 
conduct an independent review of the evidence and to make his own 
findings regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances.”31  They 
concluded that as long as the judge’s override was not based on an 
arbitrary or discriminatory imposition of the death penalty, it was 
valid.
32
 
Walton v. Arizona 
Similarly, in Walton v. Arizona,
33
 the Supreme Court upheld a 
judge’s imposition of the death penalty after he found the requisite 
aggravating factors.
34
  In his appeal, the defendant claimed that this 
decision was unconstitutional because a judge and not a jury imposed 
the death penalty.
35
  In explaining their decision, the Court relied on 
Cabana v. Bullock,
36
 which held that the Sixth Amendment does not 
provide “a defendant with the right to have a jury consider the 
appropriateness of a capital sentence.”37  They went on to state that 
determining “whether a defendant’s constitutional rights have been 
violated, has long been viewed as one that a trial judge or an appellate 
court is fully competent to make.”38  In Walton, the Court also 
emphasized the difference between finding “elements of an offense” 
and sentencing “considerations.”39  They argued that balancing 
aggravating and mitigating factors are different because they do not 
 
 29. Id. at 451. 
 30. Id.at 451–52. 
 31. Id. at 466. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990). 
 34. Id. at 647. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986). 
 37. Id. at 385–86. 
 38. Id. at 386. 
 39. Walton, 497 U.S. at 648 (quoting Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147 (1986)) 
(“Aggravating circumstances are not separate penalties or offenses, but are ‘standards to 
guide the making of [the] choice’ between the alternative verdicts of death and life 
imprisonment.  Thus, under Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme, the judge’s finding of any 
particular aggravating circumstance does not of itself ‘convict’ a defendant (i.e., require the 
death penalty), and the failure to find any particular aggravating circumstance does not 
‘acquit’ a defendant (i.e., preclude the death penalty).”). 
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involve elements of the crime itself.
40
  In other words, determining a 
convicted individual’s sentence is not protected under the Sixth 
Amendment and can be done solely by a judge. 
The Court reiterated their rationale from Spaziano, as well as 
many other cases, in holding that it did not violate the Sixth 
Amendment for a judge to impose a death penalty sentence: “Any 
argument that the Constitution requires that a jury impose the sentence 
of death or make the findings prerequisite to imposition of such a 
sentence has been soundly rejected by prior decisions of this Court.”41 
Apprendi v. New Jersey 
Although not involving the death penalty, in Apprendi v. New 
Jersey,
42
 the Supreme Court made a decision regarding the jury’s role 
in criminal cases that appeared to contradict Walton: “Other than the 
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, 
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”43  The Court went on to 
explain that this finding did not invalidate Walton, but instead is 
distinguishable because in Walton the jury already declared the 
defendant guilty of murder, a crime that “carries as its maximum 
penalty the sentence of death.”44 
However, the dissent in Apprendi argued that the majority’s 
decision effectively overruled Walton: “If the Court does not intend to 
overrule Walton, one would be hard pressed to tell from the opinion it 
issues today.”45  In other words, the dissent argued that because the 
majority held that a jury needed to decide any fact that increased the 
statutory maximum sentence, if a jury imposed a sentence of life in 
prison based on their findings of fact and a judge then overrode this 
sentence and imposed death, he or she is making a factual decision that 
an aggravating factor exists and there is a lack of sufficient mitigating 
factors, which, in effect, increases the maximum sentence to death.
46
  
This scenario would be unconstitutional under Apprendi but was 
upheld in Walton. 
 
 40. See id. 
 41. Id. at 647–48 (citing Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 745 (1990)). 
 42. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 43. Id. at 490. 
 44. Id. at 496–97 (citing Justice Scalia’s dissent in Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 
257, n. 2 and Justice Thomas’ concurrence in Jones, 526 U.S. at 250–51). 
 45. Id. at 538. 
 46. See id. 
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2. Modern Interpretation of Death Penalty and Sixth 
Amendment: 
Ring v. Arizona 
The Supreme Court needed to address the seemingly contradictory 
holdings in the wake of the Walton and Apprendi decisions.  They 
chose to tackle this conflict in Ring v. Arizona.
47
  In Ring, the jury 
found the defendant guilty of felony murder due to his apparent 
involvement with a murder that occurred during the course of a 
robbery.
48
  Based on Arizona law involving first-degree murder, in 
order for Ring to be sentenced to death the court had to make further 
findings.
49
 
Under Arizona law, the judge who presided at trial conducts a 
sentencing hearing and the judge could only sentence Ring to death if 
he found at least one aggravating circumstance and no sufficient 
mitigating circumstances.
50
  At the sentencing hearing, one of Ring’s 
co-defendants testified that Ring had been the leader and was the one 
who actually shot the victim.
51
  The judge entered a “Special Verdict” 
sentencing Ring to death based on the finding that Ring was the actual 
killer, and he also found that Ring was a major participant in the 
robbery and armed robbery “is unquestionably a crime that carries with 
it a grave risk of death.”52 
The judge also found two aggravating factors associated with 
Ring’s offense.53  First, Ring “committed the offense in expectation of 
receiving something of ‘pecuniary value,’”54 and second, the crime was 
committed “in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner.”55  
The judge found one mitigating factor that was not in the statute, 
Ring’s “minimal criminal record.”56  However, he found that this factor 
 
 47. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
 48. Id. at 591. 
 49. Id. at 592. 
 50. Id. at 592–93. 
 51. Id. at 593. 
 52. Id. at 594 (citing the holding from Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) 
that the Eighth Amendment requires finding that defendants convicted of felony murder 
killed or attempted to kill and the holding from Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) 
that qualifies Enmund by saying the Eighth Amendment allows for the execution of a 
felony-murder defendant “who did not kill or attempt to kill, but who was a ‘major 
participa[nt] in the felony committed’ and who demonstrated ‘reckless indifference to 
human life’”). 
 53. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 594 (2002).  
 54. Id. at 594–95.  Specifically, the judge found that “[t]aking the cash from the 
armored car was the motive and reason for Mr. Magoch’s murder and not just the result.” 
 55. Id. at 595.  “In support of this finding, he cited Ring’s comment, as reported by 
Greenham at the sentencing hearing, expressing pride in his marksmanship.” 
 56. Id. 
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did not “call for leniency,” and Ring was sentenced to death.57 
Ring appealed his sentence and one of his arguments was that 
Arizona’s sentencing requirements violate the Sixth Amendment 
because “it entrusts to a judge the finding of a fact raising the 
defendant’s maximum penalty.”58 
After granting review, the Supreme Court began its opinion by 
explaining the Arizona Supreme Court’s opinion.  That court agreed 
with the dissent in Apprendi, but at the same time Walton bound them, 
as it had not been overruled:
59
 “[i]t therefore rejected Ring’s 
constitutional attack on the State’s capital murder judicial sentencing 
system.”60  Ring also challenged the validity of the assessment of the 
aggravating and mitigating factors.
61
  The Arizona Supreme Court 
agreed that the depravity factor had not been proven, but upheld the 
pecuniary gain as an aggravating factor and affirmed the death penalty 
sentence.
62
 
The issue that the Supreme Court had to address in Ring was 
whether, under the Sixth Amendment applicable to the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment, a judge rather than a jury could find an 
aggravating factor that increased the statutory maximum penalty a 
defendant faced.
63
 
The Supreme Court summarized much of the case law on the topic 
of a defendant’s right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment and 
ultimately concluded that Walton, in relevant part, cannot survive 
Apprendi.
64
  The Court explained Ring was exposed to a more severe 
sentence—death—based on the judge’s finding of an aggravating 
circumstance, and this contradicts Apprendi.
65
  They also concluded 
that attempting to distinguish “sentencing factors” from “elements of 
an offense” is ineffective because Apprendi holds that it is the effect of 
the finding that matters, not the label it is given.
66
  The pertinent 
question is whether the finding at issue increases the statutory 
maximum punishment; if it does, then the finding must be made by a 
jury to be constitutional.
67
 
The Court also explained that the fact that the death penalty is at 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 595. 
 59. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 596 (2002). 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 597. 
 64. Id. at 603. 
 65. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 604 (2002). 
 66. Id. at 604–06. 
 67. See id. at 604–05. 
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issue does not mean that the rules are different regarding a defendant’s 
constitutional rights.
68
  Determinations about aggravating factors must 
be left to a jury rather than a judge in all criminal cases where the 
defendant elects to have a jury as the finder of fact because this finding 
has severe ramifications for the defendant’s sentence; in Arizona’s 
statute, it was literally the difference between life and death. 
The Court also dismissed Arizona’s assertion that judicial findings 
of fact regarding aggravating factors are more accurate and should 
therefore be utilized for this purpose.
69
 
The Court concluded their opinion by overruling “Walton to the 
extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find 
an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death 
penalty.”70  This is due to the fact that in this case, aggravating factors 
serve as “the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,’ 
the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.”71  This 
holding established the expansion of a convicted murderer’s Sixth 
Amendment right,
72
 but left open the question of whether this 
expansion extends to individuals who face the death penalty due to 
their role in the offense—without having committed the underlying 
murder. 
3. Vicarious Liability and Constitutional Challenges to Death 
Penalty Sentences 
Most of the individuals who have been executed under death 
penalty laws were found guilty of committing the underlying murder at 
issue.
73
  Other than the actual killer, another group of individuals who 
 
 68. See id. at 606–07. 
 69. Id. at 607–09.  The Court explained that “‘[t]he founders of the American Republic 
were not prepared to leave it to the State, which is why the jury-trial guarantee was one of 
the least controversial provisions of the Bill of Rights. It has never been efficient; but it has 
always been free.’”  (citing Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498).  The 
Court also argued that it is not evident that a judge’s assessment is more reliable than a 
jury’s, and that many other states leave the finding of aggravating factors to juries.   
 70. Id. at 609. 
 71. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, n. 
19).  
 72. Alabama remains the only state to permit a judge to override a jury’s life verdict 
and impose the death penalty. Kent Faulk, In Alabama, You Can Be Sentenced to Death 
Even if Jurors Don’t Agree, THE MARSHALL PROJECT: NONPROFIT JOURNALISM ABOUT 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Dec. 7, 2016, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/12/07/in-alabama-you-can-be-sentenced-to-death-
even-if-jurors-don-t-agree#.DKxCTfoVi; see also The Death Penalty in Alabama: Judge 
Override: Executive Summary and Major Findings, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, 
http://eji.org/reports/death-penalty-alabama-judge-override. 
 73. Those Executed Who did not Directly Kill the Victim, DEATH PENALTY 
INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/those-executed-who-did-not-
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may be eligible for the death penalty include individuals accused of 
felony murder, or individuals who “participated in a felony during 
which a victim died at the hands of another participant in the felony.”74  
Many states have such felony murder laws or variations thereof and 
have carried out executions based on these convictions.
75
  Defendants 
convicted of felony murder have successfully challenged their 
convictions under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
76
  Some 
examples of such cases are described below. 
Lockett v. Ohio 
In Lockett,
77
 the defendant was convicted of aggravated murder 
and sentenced to death under an Ohio statute after she waited in the 
getaway car while a robbery-murder took place.
78
  The Supreme Court 
reversed the defendant’s death sentence, holding that Ohio’s death 
penalty statute violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment’s 
protections against cruel and unusual punishment because it did not 
allow the sentencer to consider certain mitigating factors.
79
  In their 
decision, the Court made clear that it remains constitutional for states 
to impose the death penalty against aiders and abettors or accomplices: 
“States have authority to make aiders and abettors equally responsible, 
as a matter of law, with principals, or to enact felony-murder statutes is 
beyond constitutional challenge.”80 
Enmund v. Florida 
Later, in Enmund,
81
 the Court examined whether the death penalty 
could be imposed on a defendant, Enmund, who did not take or attempt 
to take life.
82
  The defendant at issue was waiting in the getaway car 
while two others shot and killed two individuals during the course of a 
robbery.
83
  Enmund was convicted of first-degree murder and robbery 
 
directly-kill-victim. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id.  States that have executed defendants convicted of felony murder include Texas, 
Florida, Utah, Indiana, Oklahoma, and Missouri. 
 76. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 
782 (1982).   
 77. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 586. 
 78. Id. at 589-91.  
 79. Id. at 604–06.  Specifically, the Ohio statute at issue did not allow the sentencer to 
consider the character and record of the individual and the circumstances of the offense.  In 
Lockett, the Court held that these mitigating factors were constitutionally required to be 
considered in most capital cases. 
 80. See id. at 602. 
 81. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 782. 
 82. Id. at 787. 
 83. Id. at 784–86. 
210 DEATH PENALTY FOR FELONY MURDER [Vol:57 
under a Florida felony murder statute which held aiders and abettors 
liable for any murder that took place during the course of a robbery or 
attempted robbery.
84
 He was sentenced to death based on the finding of 
various aggravating factors and no mitigating factors.
85
 
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed Florida’s 
Supreme Court verdict and held that imposing the death penalty on a 
defendant who “neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to 
take life . . . is inconsistent with the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.”86  In coming to this decision, the Court took a number 
of factors into consideration. 
First, the Court looked at various state laws concerning when the 
death penalty is imposed against a defendant for “participation in a 
robbery in which another robber takes life.”87  The Court went through 
every states’ approach and found that: “only a small minority of 
jurisdictions—eight—allow the death penalty to be imposed solely 
because the defendant somehow participated in a robbery in the course 
of which a murder was committed.”88  The Court concluded, in regard 
to this factor, that because the majority of states would not authorize 
the death penalty in a case like Enmund, it weighed in favor of 
“rejecting capital punishment for the crime at issue.”89 
The Court also found support for rejecting Enmund’s sentence 
based on society’s apparent rejection of felony murder liability for 
individuals who did not themselves kill, based on jury sentencing 
statistics.
90
 
The Court concluded that because there was no indication that 
Enmund intended to kill, or for anyone to be killed, his actions did not 
merit the death penalty and he should have been treated differently than 
his co-defendants who actually committed murder.
91
 
Tison v. Arizona 
In Tison,
92
 the Supreme Court was tasked with determining 
whether two defendants’ death penalty sentences violated the Eighth 
 
 84. Id. at 785. 
 85. Id.  The aggravating factors that Florida’s Supreme Court found included the fact 
that Enmund was an “accomplice in the commission of an armed robbery” and that Enmund 
was “previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence.” 
 86. Id. at 787–88. 
 87. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789–92 (1982). 
 88. Id. at 792. 
 89. Id. at 793. 
 90. Id. at 794.  The Court relied on the results of a survey to support their conclusion: 
“The survey revealed only 6 cases out of 362 where a nontriggerman felony murderer was 
executed.”  
 91. Id. at 798. 
 92. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987). 
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Amendment.
93
  The primary issue was whether they possessed the 
requisite intent, because they were involved with a felony murder but 
neither of them intended to kill the victim nor actually pulled the 
triggers.
94
 
The defendants, two brothers, along with a third brother, helped 
their father Gary Tison and his cellmate escape prison by bringing a 
chest full of guns into the prison they were housed at.
95
  Both men were 
convicted murderers.
96
  While on the run, the two convicts along with 
the three Tison boys carjacked a family, and Gary Tison and his 
cellmate shot and killed the family.
97
 
The police eventually located the Tison boys, their father, and his 
cellmate, but during the course of their apprehension one Tison son 
was killed and their father escaped into the desert, where he 
subsequently died.
98
  The two remaining Tison boys, Raymond and 
Ricky, along with their father’s cellmate, were then tried for their 
various crimes.
99
  Among their charges, each defendant was tried for 
four counts of capital murder based on Arizona’s felony murder and 
accomplice liability laws.
100
  Each defendant was convicted under these 
laws.
101
 
Under Arizona law, in capital cases a judge conducts a sentencing 
proceeding to determine “whether the crime was sufficiently 
aggravated to warrant the death sentence.”102  The judge found three 
aggravating factors and no statutory mitigating factors.
103
 
The judge found that the defendant’s participation “in the crimes 
giving rise to the application of the felony murder rule was very 
substantial.”104  The trial judge also found that each defendant “could 
reasonably have foreseen that his conduct . . . would cause or create a 
 
 93. Id. at 138. 
 94. See id. 
 95. Id. at 139. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 139–41. 
 98. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 141 (1987).  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id.  Arizona’s felony murder law was as follows: “providing that a killing occurring 
during the perpetration of robbery or kidnapping is capital murder.”  Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
13-452 (1956) (repealed 1978).  Arizona’s accomplice liability law stated “that each 
participant in the kidnaping or robbery is legally responsible for the acts of his 
accomplices.”  Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-139 (1956) (repealed 1978). 
 101. Id. at 141–42. 
 102. Id. at 142 (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-454(A) (Supp. 1973) (repealed 1978)). 
 103. Id. at 142.  The three aggravating factors that the judge found included that “the 
Tisons had created a grave risk of death to others (not the victims); the murders had been 
committed for pecuniary gain; the murders were especially heinous.” 
 104. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 142 (1987) (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-
454(F)(3) (Supp. 1973) (repealed 1978)). 
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grave risk of . . . death.”105 
The judge also found numerous non-statutory mitigating factors, 
including: “the petitioners’ youth—Ricky was 20 and Raymond was 
19; neither had prior felony records; each had been convicted of the 
murders under the felony murder rule.”106  However, the defendants 
were sentenced to death.
107
  The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the 
brothers’ sentences;108 they reached this conclusion based on the 
following rationale: 
The record establishes that both Ricky and Raymond Tison were 
present when the homicides took place and that they occurred as 
part of and in the course of the escape and continuous attempt to 
prevent recapture.  The deaths would not have occurred but for 
their assistance.  That they did not specifically intend that the 
Lyonses and Theresa Tyson die, that they did not plot in advance 
that these homicides would take place, or that they did not actually 
pull the triggers on the guns which inflicted the fatal wounds is of 
little significance.
109
 
In evaluating the trial court’s findings, the Arizona Supreme Court 
upheld the pecuniary gain and heinousness aggravating factors as well 
as the death sentences.
110
  The United States Supreme Court denied the 
Tisons’ petition for certiorari.111 
Enmund was decided in the interim, which held that in order to 
impose the death penalty on a defendant accused of felony murder, it 
must be proven that the defendant intended to kill.
112
  In light of 
Enmund, the Tisons’ again appealed their case to the Arizona Supreme 
Court.
113
  In each brother’s case, the Arizona Supreme Court found that 
there was evidence beyond a reasonable doubt demonstrating both 
brothers’ intent to kill.114 
In Raymond Tison’s appeal, the court relied on various incidents 
that took place during the prison breakout and during the incidents 
leading up to and after the murders.
115
  During the breakout, the court 
found that because Raymond assisted with his father’s breakout, which 
included holding a gun to prison guards, knew that his father was 
 
 105. Id. (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-454(F)(4) (Supp. 1973) (repealed 1978)). 
 106. Id. at 142–43. 
 107. Id. at 143. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 143 (1987) (citing State v. (Ricky Wayne) 
Tison, 129 Ariz. 526, 545 (1981)). 
 110. Id. at 143. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 143–44. 
 113. See id. 
 114. Id. at 143–46. 
 115. See Tison, v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 143–45 (1987). 
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serving a life sentence for murder, and later told police that he would 
have killed in a “very close life or death situation,”116 these facts 
showed that Raymond “could anticipate the use of lethal force” during 
the breakout.
117
 
The court also found that he possessed the requisite intent during 
the carjacking and murders.
118
  The facts that he provided the murder 
weapons, actively participated in the carjacking, and watched as four 
people were murdered and did nothing, all showed the court that he 
intended to kill.
119
  The court distinguished the Tison cases from 
Enmund because in Enmund, the defendant was not at the location 
where the victims were killed and he did not “actively participate in the 
events leading to death.”120  The court applied a similar rationale in 
finding that Ricky Tison also possessed the necessary intent and denied 
his appeal as well.
121
 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if the Arizona 
Supreme Court correctly applied Enmund.
122
  The Court first went 
through the facts of Enmund.
123
  Next, it turned to the rationale the 
Court employed in Enmund, which included examining various states’ 
laws as well as juries’ views on liability for felony murder and 
assessing how the law in question compared to the majority of states’ 
approaches.
124
  This allowed it to come to the conclusion that being 
convicted of felony murder was not enough to sentence a defendant to 
the death penalty.
125
  The Court then reiterated its analysis from 
Enmund.
126
  As an initial matter, the Court stated that imposing the 
death penalty for armed robbery is excessive and violates the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments as cruel and unusual punishment.
127
  It 
also found that Enmund’s “tangential” role in the murders paired the 
lack of evidence of a culpable mental state weighed in favor of the 
death penalty being an improper punishment in that case.
128
 
The Court went on to distinguish the types of cases that Enmund 
addressed from the case presented in Tison.  Unlike Enmund, Tison 
 
 116. See id. at 144. 
 117. See id. 
 118. See id. at 144–45.   
 119. See id. 
 120. Id. at 145 (citing State v. Tison, 142 Ariz. 454, 456–57 (1984)). 
 121. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 145 (1987). 
 122. See id. at 145–46. 
 123. See id. at 146. 
 124. See id. at 146–48. 
 125. See id. at 148. 
 126. See id. at 148–58. 
 127. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 148 (1987) (quoting Weems v. United States, 
217 U.S. 349, 371 (1910)). 
 128. See id. at 148–49. 
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involved accomplices who were at the scene where the murder took 
place and played a major role in the crime; however, they did not 
clearly kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill the victims.
129
  In 
explaining the intent issue, the Court agreed with petitioners in that 
they did not intend to kill in the traditional sense of the word: 
“Traditionally, one intends certain consequences when he desires that 
his acts cause those consequences or knows that those consequences 
are substantially certain to result from his acts.”130  In the decision 
below, the Arizona Supreme Court “attempted to reformulate ‘intent to 
kill’ as a species of foreseeability.”131  Specifically, the Arizona 
Supreme Court defined intent as follows: 
Intend [sic] to kill includes the situation in which the defendant 
intended, contemplated, or anticipated that lethal force would or 
might be used or that life would or might be taken in accomplishing 
the underlying felony.
132
 
The Court initially acknowledged that this definition was broader 
than the definition utilized in Enmund and would render most armed 
robbers liable.
133
  Conversely, the Tison brothers’ behavior was more 
culpable than the defendant in Enmund and may render them liable 
under state laws that allow intent to be shown through reckless 
indifference to human life.
134
  The main issue addressed in Tison was 
whether there is an Eighth Amendment violation when a defendant 
who was a major participant in a felony murder and demonstrated 
reckless indifference to human life is sentenced to death.
135
 
In making their determination, the Court employed a similar 
strategy as utilized in Enmund: they concluded that a majority of 
American legislatures allowed the death penalty to be applied to 
defendants who played a major role in a felony murder,
136
 and that 
acting with reckless indifference to human life was a sufficiently 
culpable mental state.
137
  Here, the first issue—that the petitioners 
played a major role in the crime—was proven as explained above, but 
the Court remanded the case so it could be determined whether the 
Tison brothers acted with reckless disregard for human life.
138
 
 
 129. See id. at 149–51. 
 130. Id. at 150 (quoting W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law § 28, p. 196 (1972)). 
 131. Id. at 150. 
 132. Id. (quoting State v. Tison, 142 Ariz., 454, 456 (1984)). 
 133. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 150–51 (1987).  
 134. See id. at 151. 
 135. See id. at 152. 
 136. See id. at 152–55. 
 137. See id. at 157–58. 
 138. See id. at 158. 
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II. LEGAL PROBLEM: PROPER ANALYSIS OF SIXTH 
AMENDMENT CLAIMS FOR ACCOMPLICES TO FELONY 
MURDER SENTENCED TO DEATH 
The cases discussed in previous sections illustrate how the 
Supreme Court would likely rule if a convicted murderer were to make 
a Sixth Amendment challenge, as well as how the Court would rule on 
an Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a death penalty under 
a felony murder conviction.  However, there is a paucity of case law, 
and thus the question has been left open, as to how the Court would 
rule if a defendant who was charged as an accomplice or for felony 
murder brought a Sixth Amendment challenge. 
In attempting to predict how such cases would be decided if 
presented before the Court, this Comment will examine the approach 
utilized in Ring to address how Tison cases with defendants bringing 
Sixth Amendment claims should be addressed. 
III. ANALYSIS: RING & TISON 
The relevant aspects of Ring and Tison will be discussed to 
highlight the current question of how the Court would assess a case that 
presents overlapping issues.  Specifically, this Comment analyzes the 
issue presented in Ring, a Sixth Amendment claim that a jury should 
make a mitigating or aggravating factor determination, if brought by a 
defendant who is being charged as an accomplice or for felony murder, 
as in Tison. 
A. Current Approach to Sixth Amendment Claims: Ring v. 
Arizona 
In Ring, the Supreme Court held that juries must make findings of 
fact that increase the statutory maximum sentence a defendant faces in 
order to comply with the Sixth Amendment.
139
  While this is an 
important finding, it only addresses the constitutional rights of a 
defendant who actually committed the underlying murder. 
In Ring, the defendant was found guilty of felony murder based on 
his involvement with a murder that transpired during the course of a 
robbery.
140
  The only way that Ring could be sentenced to death based 
on this verdict was if the judge made further findings.
141
  Specifically, 
the judge had to find one aggravating factor and no sufficient 
mitigating factors.
142
  At Ring’s sentencing hearing, the judge found 
 
 139. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
 140. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 141. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 142. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
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that Ring had been the actual killer as well as a major participant based 
on testimony from Ring’s co-defendant.143  He also found two 
aggravating circumstances associated with Ring’s offense: pecuniary 
gain and heinousness of the crime.
144
  Based on the judge’s findings, 
Ring was sentenced to death.
145
 
Ring appealed his sentence, claiming, among other things, that his 
sentence violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because 
Arizona’s sentencing law entrusts a judge with making factual 
determinations that increase a defendant’s maximum penalty.146 
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed Ring’s sentence 
upon determining that Arizona’s sentencing laws violated the recently 
decided Apprendi case.
147
  In coming to this conclusion, the Court 
addressed several conceivable arguments that opponents might assert 
and why the opinion it reached is the correct application of Apprendi.
148
  
The first potential argument the Court responded to was whether 
“sentencing factors” should be treated differently than “elements of an 
offense.”149  It responded to this possibility by restating the rationale 
employed in Apprendi: it is the effect that matters, not the label.
150
  If a 
defendant’s statutory maximum penalty is increased by a fact found by 
the judge, then this violates the Sixth Amendment.
151
 
The Court also found that the argument that defendants facing the 
death penalty should be given less constitutional protection than other 
criminal defendants is without merit: “Arizona presents ‘no specific 
reason for excepting capital defendants from the constitutional 
protections . . . extended to defendants generally, and none is readily 
apparent.’”152 
Finally, the Court dismissed the argument that judges are better 
able to make these kinds of fact-finding determinations.
153
  The Court 
stated that this was not evident
154
 and also emphasized that juries are 
trusted with making such aggravating and mitigating factor 
 
 143. See supra notes 52 and accompanying text. 
 144. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text. 
 145. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 146. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 147. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 148. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text; see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 
584, 604–09 (2002).   
 149. See supra notes 67 and accompanying text. 
 150. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 151. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 152. Ring, 536 U.S. at 606 (quoting Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 
539); see also supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 153. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 154. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 607. 
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determinations in a majority of other jurisdictions.
155
  It also drew upon 
the rationale that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to a 
jury trial if they so desire: 
The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions 
reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be 
enforced and justice administered . . . If the defendant preferred the 
common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps 
less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it.
156
 
After dismissing all of the potential arguments described above, 
the Court concluded that “[c]apital defendants, no less than noncapital 
defendants . . . are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which 
the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum 
punishment.”157  However, as previously stated, the Ring decision was 
limited in scope as to applying to cases where the defendant was found 
to be the actual killer. 
B. Death Penalty Imposed on Non-Murderers: Tison v. Arizona 
In Tison, the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of 
Arizona’s felony murder law.158  The defendants and petitioners, 
Raymond and Ricky Tison, helped two convicted murderers, their 
father and his cellmate, escape from prison
159
 and subsequently were 
involved with a carjacking that resulted in the murder of four 
individuals.
160
  Although their father and his cellmate were the ones 
who actually committed the four murders,
161
 Raymond and Ricky were 
also convicted of the four murders based on Arizona’s accomplice 
liability and felony murder statutes.
162
  The brothers were sentenced to 
death.
163
 
The Tison brothers appealed their death sentences numerous 
times
164
 and eventually the Supreme Court reviewed their case to see if 
it was consistent with Enmund, a recently decided Supreme Court 
case.
165
  Ultimately the Court remanded the Tison brothers’ cases so the 
defendants’ levels of culpability could be determined.166 
 
 155. See id. at 607–08. 
 156. Id. at 609 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155–56 (1968)). 
 157. Id. at 589. 
 158. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text. 
 159. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
 160. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
 
 161. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 162. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text. 
 163. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 164. See supra notes 110–113 and accompanying text. 
 165. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 166. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
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Tison is relevant to this Comment because the case demonstrates 
that it remains constitutional to sentence an individual to death who did 
not commit the underlying murder at issue.
167
  Tison is also important 
because it illustrates the analysis utilized by the Court in reaching their 
opinion regarding other constitutional amendments.
168
 
Tison holds that it is constitutional to sentence an individual to 
death who did not actually commit murder when certain factors are 
met.
169
  Specifically, the defendant must have played a substantial role 
in the crime and their level of culpability must meet a certain level: 
“substantial participation in a violent felony under circumstances likely 
to result in the loss of innocent human life may justify the death 
penalty even absent an “intent to kill.”170  The Court listed a number of 
scenarios where they did not overturn such types of death penalty 
convictions.
171
 
The Court expanded upon the notion that the level of culpability a 
defendant had in the crime plays an important role in sentencing: 
A critical facet of the individualized determination of culpability 
required in capital cases is the mental state with which the 
defendant commits the crime.  Deeply ingrained in our legal 
tradition is the idea that the more purposeful is the criminal 
conduct, the more serious is the offense, and, therefore, the more 
severely it ought to be punished.
172
 
The Court concluded that in addition to “intending to kill,” “the 
reckless disregard for human life implicit in knowingly engaging in 
criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death represents a 
highly culpable mental state”173 and suggested that this level of 
 
 167. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 168. See supra notes 136–138 and accompanying text. 
 169. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
 
 170. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 154 (1987) (citing Clines v. State, 280 Ark. 77, 84 
(1983)). 
 171. See id. at 154–55 (citing Clines, 280 Ark. at 84 (armed, forced entry, nighttime 
robbery of private dwelling known to be occupied plus evidence that killing contemplated), 
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984); Deputy v. State, 500 A. 2d 581, 599–600 (Del. 1985) 
(defendant present at scene; robbed victims; conflicting evidence as to participation in 
killing), cert. pending, No. 85-6272; Ruffin v. State, 420 So. 2d 591, 594 (Fla. 1982) 
(defendant present, assisted codefendant in kidnaping, raped victim, made no effort to 
interfere with codefendant’s killing victim and continued on the joint venture); People v. 
Davis, 95 Ill. 2d 1, 52, (defendant present at the scene and had participated in other crimes 
with Holman, the triggerman, during which Holman had killed under similar circumstances), 
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1001 (1983); Selvage v. State, 680 S. W. 2d 17, 22 (Tex. Cr. App. 
1984) (participant in jewelry store robbery during the course of which a security guard was 
killed; no evidence that defendant himself shot the guard but he did fire a weapon at those 
who gave chase); see also Allen v. State, 253 Ga. 390, 395, n. 3 (1984)). 
 172. Id. at 156. 
 173. Id. at 157. 
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culpability might be enough to warrant a death sentence.
174
 
In coming to the above determinations, the Court employed a 
similar strategy as that utilized in Enmund.
175
  It looked at numerous 
state laws on felony murder and accomplice liability.
176
  It also looked 
at overall trends and the majority view on this subject.
177
  Because a 
majority of the states allow defendants convicted of felony murder to 
be sentenced to death (under various standards and upon finding 
differing levels of culpability)
178
 the Court determined that the death 
penalty could be instituted upon defendants who played a major role 
and exhibited a reckless disregard for human life.
179
 
Tison presented the type of defendant that is the focus of this 
Comment in terms of assessing whether the Sixth Amendment should 
apply.  In other words, whether juries need to make aggravating and 
mitigating factor determinations when it increases the maximum 
statutory penalty to death for defendants who were convicted under 
accomplice or felony murder laws. 
IV. PROPOSAL 
If the Supreme Court was presented with and granted certiorari to 
a case similar to Tison v. Arizona, with the exception that the defendant 
brought a Sixth Amendment claim, the Supreme Court should extend 
the holding of Ring v. Arizona to these types of cases. 
In light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Ring that the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution requires a jury to make 
findings of fact when a defendant’s maximum statutory punishment is 
increased by finding aggravating and a lack of substantial mitigating 
factors,
180
 the Court should find that this logic also applies to Tison-
type cases. 
All of the Court’s reasons for their holding in Ring are also 
applicable to defendants who have been convicted as accomplices or 
under felony murder laws and face the death penalty.  As previously 
discussed by the Supreme Court in Ring, the protection of a jury trial 
extends to all criminal defendants.
181
  Ring specifically held that it 
would not make sense for this right and protection not to apply to death 
 
 174. See id. at 157–58. 
 175. See id. at 152-55; see also supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text. 
 176. Tison, v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 152–54 (1987); see also supra notes 138–39 and 
accompanying text. 
 177. See Tison, 481 U.S. at 152–54.;  
 178. See id. 
 179. See id. at 158. 
 180. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
 181. See supra note 69.  
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penalty cases.
182
  Because the Court has held that it is constitutional for 
accomplices and those convicted of felony murder to be sentenced to 
death under certain circumstances they should also be given the same 
constitutional protections. 
The Court also stated in Ring that it is not clear that judges are 
better situated than a jury to make findings of fact regarding 
aggravating and mitigating factors.
183
  This conclusion does not differ 
for judges or juries presiding over cases involving fact finding where 
the defendant is convicted under accomplice or felony murder laws.  
Additionally, the Court found that many states rely on juries to make 
such findings.
184
  It follows that juries would similarly be able to make 
such determinations involving individuals who did not commit the 
murder at issue.  Finally, they stressed that criminal defendants have 
the right to decide if they want a judge or jury to make the factual 
findings in their case.
185
  This should not change simply because the 
defendant did not actually commit the underlying murder. 
Because in Ring the defendant was ultimately found to have 
committed the murder that made him eligible for the death penalty,
186
 
the Court did not specifically address what standard applies to 
accomplices or felony murder convicts.  However, the rationale that 
was utilized in Ring, that all defendants should be entitled to have the 
ability to have a jury make findings of fact that could increase the 
statutory maximum penalty,
187
 logically extends to defendants 
convicted as accomplices or for felony murder who would similarly 
face the death penalty upon such factual findings. 
When an individual convicted as an accomplice or for felony 
murder is being sentenced and the death penalty is at issue, a jury 
should be required to make findings of fact in terms of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, or lack thereof, that would make the 
defendant eligible for the death penalty.  In Tison the defendants’ 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were at issue,
188
 but it would 
make little sense for these individuals not to similarly be given the 
protections of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The death penalty is a provocative issue that has spurred debate in 
 
 182. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 183. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
 
 184. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 185. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 186. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 187. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
 188. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 152 (1987).
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the United States since its inception.
189
  Because the death penalty has 
yet to be deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court,
190
 it remains 
vital to continue these debates as well as postulate how the Supreme 
Court might analyze various cases involving the death penalty in an 
upcoming term. 
The Supreme Court has changed its stance on the constitutionality 
of various aspects of the death penalty over the years.
191
  Overall, the 
Court has limited the use of the death penalty by making various 
decisions that narrowed the scope in terms of who this form of 
punishment may be applied to,
192
 as well as what types of crimes are 
eligible for this sentence.
193
 
The Supreme Court has also changed its view on what the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution means in terms of right 
to a jury trial.
194
  Originally, the Court held that this right only extends 
to “elements of an offense” and not “sentencing factors.”195  However, 
in a subsequent case, Ring v. Arizona, the Court determined that the 
Sixth Amendment right is not limited by the label that the legislature 
uses, in terms of “elements of an offense” or “sentencing factors,”196 
but extends to whenever there is a fact that would mean a defendant 
faces a punishment that exceeds the statutory maximum.
197
 
The Supreme Court also held in Tison v. Arizona that it is 
constitutional to sentence a defendant to death who did not commit 
murder but was convicted as an accomplice or found guilty of felony 
murder under certain circumstances.
198
  Specifically, the defendant had 
to be a major participant in the felony
199
 that a murder occurred during 
the course of, and the defendant also had to either intend for the death 
to occur or exhibit a reckless disregard for human life.
200
 
Cases like Tison, but that involve defendants bringing Sixth 
Amendment right to jury trial claims, should be decided similarly to 
Ring.  That is, accomplices or individuals convicted for felony murder 
have the same constitutional rights as other criminal defendants and are 
entitled to have a jury determine findings of fact that may increase the 
 
 189. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 190. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 191. See supra Parts IA–IB and accompanying text. 
 192. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 193. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 194. See supra notes 26–72 and accompanying text. 
 195. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. 
 196. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 197. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 198. See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text. 
 199. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 200. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
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statutory maximum penalty they face including aggravating and 
mitigating factors.  If a criminal defendant chooses to have a jury trial a 
jury should be entrusted with making fact finding determinations 
surrounding aggravating and mitigating circumstances when assessing 
whether the death penalty should be applied to accomplices or those 
convicted for felony murder who are major participants in the crime 
and who display a reckless disregard for human life. 
 
